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Abstract 
The inequilibrium between the supplies of palm oil fresh fruit bunches (FFB) and the availability of palm oil mill 
causes the exploitation of palm oil fresh fruit bunches prices of farmers’ production, especially supply from 
estate smallholders (independent and plasma farmers). The exploitation of prices occur because of: a) market 
structure of palm oil fresh fruit bunches is oligopsony market, b) the value of conjectural elasticity is high, and c) 
the price elasticity value of supply and demand are small (0.19 and 0.048 are inelastic). This condition shows 
that oligopsony market power has sizeable and dominant influence on price determination of palm oil fresh fruit 
bunches in the input market. As the result, income, productivity and production of farmers are low. However, if 
farmers join in a cooperative institutional use oligopoly market power, so farmers can sell palm oil fresh fruit 
bunches at higher price or up to 34.86% of farmers’ real prices. Therefore, the price policy of government should 
consider to the elements of market power (conjectural elasticity) and the factors that influence market power 
(demand and supply price elasticities). The approach of bilateral monopoly market model can be an alternative 
solution of oligopsony market structure.      
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1. Introduction 
Central Kalimantan is one of the seven provinces of palm oil production centres in Indonesia and ranks fourth 
after Riau, North Sumatra and South Sumatra Provinces. Approximately 16.06% of palm oil plantation area and 
11.62% of palm oil production in Indonesia is located in this province, the land and production shares are 
27.68% (Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia, 2012). However, there is inequilibrium between supply 
of palm oil fresh fruit bunches and the availability of palm oil mill, especially the supply from estate 
smallholders (independent and plasma farmers) (Syazda, 2013). The marketing system of palm oil in Indonesia 
is based on the dualistic economic system between economic democracy and economic conglomeration which 
have capacity and accessibility differences (Gumbira Sa'id, E dan Harizt Intan. A, 2001). This matter causes the 
exploitation of palm oil fresh fruit bunches prices of farmers’ production, because the firm of palm oil mill is the 
only buyer (as prices determinant), then the market structure is tended to imperfect competition which leads to 
monopsony or oligopsony market. In addition, inequilibrium between the relationships of supply and demand 
cause the price to fluctuate. 
Furthermore, Faisal Basri (1997) also stated, inequilibrium between productive resources supply with demand 
(processing industrial) will causes the low competitiveness, this condition will raise the price deviations. Due to 
price deviation on farm level, it leads to lower prices of palm oil fresh fruit bunches, then resulting low income 
of farmers. In this condition, the farmers cannot do much, because the price is determined by buyer (the nucleus 
firm or branch or subsidiary companies). In this position, farmers deal with market power of palm oil fresh fruit 
bunches that tends to be monopsonistic / oligopsonistic, so that farmers are always disadvantaged. The 
management of palm oil plantations in Central Kalimantan is mostly collaborated with Nucleus Estate 
Smallholders. 
Based on the field informations, there is matters which not in accordance with the expected goals. So far, the 
implementation of the Nucleus Estate Smallholders of palm oil plantations, often appear incompatibility of the 
relationships between plasma farmers and the nucleus firms, especially in terms of price determination 
transparency of palm oil fresh fruit bunches, scales measurement and rendement calculations (Irma, 1999, Bamin, 
2000; Didu, 2000 and Andy Mulyana 2003). In order to protect farmers, government issued policy series to 
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determining prices of palm oil fresh fruit bunches, but the implementation is actually distorted with aim to 
uniform the price of palm oil fresh fruit bunches of farmers production both plasma and non-plasma. 
This term becomes potentially behaviour which opposite with the principles of fair competition. The current 
problem is how the price determination of palm oil fresh fruit bunches on imperfect competition market, so the 
aim of this research is to identify the market structure of palm oil fresh fruit bunches, to analyze price 
determination of palm oil fresh fruit bunches on imperfect competition market power, to analyze the factors that 
influence to the imperfect competition market power in price determination of palm oil fresh fruit bunches, to 
analyze price determination of palm oil fresh fruit bunches with approach of bilateral monopoly market structure 
model, to recommend the policy which required to increase the income and productivity of farmers.  
 
2. Theoretical Frameworks 
Market structure has quite important role in the production factor market equilibrium, taking into calculation of 
product market structure which related with those factor market (Hirshleifer, 1985). Generally, market structure 
is divided into: perfect competition and imperfect competition markets. Imperfect competition market structure 
of seller side, such as monopoly, oligopoly and monopolistic competition markets (Miller and Meiners, 1993; 
Sukirna, 1994). 
Furthermore, Henderson and Quandt (1980) added imperfect competition market structure of buyer side: 
monopsony and oligopsony market structures. In the economic concept, price determination of a firm is 
determined by market structure. Commonly, perfect competition market can only reach a normal profit, where 
firm obtains profit from average fixed cost (AFC) or price equals to average total cost (ATC). Whereas, the firm 
which on the imperfect competition market can reaches pure profit, firm can determines prices above the average 
total cost (Anindita, 2008). Either monopoly or monopsony is represented imperfection in competition and they 
will provide a certain impact, such as in the input market, towards input price, input usage and economic welfare 
(Miller, 1983). 
Market power is realized as the ability to hold prices above marginal production cost. Market power is the most 
frequently issues discussed in the industrial organization, because it produces the welfare and inefficiency losses. 
According to Diana, Chalil and Fredoun Ahmadi-Esfahani, (2005 and 2006), there are multiple approaches 
toward market power modelling in input and output markets on the palm oil production processing chain in 
Indonesia. Market power modelling can be divided into several approaches, such as model which only measures 
monopoly / oligopoly powers or only measure monopsony / oligopsony powers or both. 
To measure the parameters of monopoly / oligopoly market power is obtained from first-order conditions of 
upstream firms profit function (Appelbaum 1982 and Iwata, 1974), seller power parameter is called as 
conjectural elasticity, which is conjectural variation elasticity. Conjectural variation is a parameter which 
estimates the reaction of other competitors if the firm changes the output quantity or price. Whereas, to measure 
the parameters of monopsony / oligopsonistic market power is obtained from first-order conditions of buyer 
profit functions or downstream companies (Muth et al., 1999, Koontz and Philip, 1997), and in the same way, the 
buyer power parameters can also be presented as conjectural elasticity. 
Model of two sides behaviour are divided into two groups, namely the composite (combined) and dominant 
models. In the composite model (Schroeter et al.2000), both buyer and seller are considered as single integration 
firm which chooses the optimal levels of input and output to maximize profit. While, the dominant model 
(Buschena and Perloff, 1991, 1996 and Murniningtyas Azzam, 2000), each buyer or seller choose the optimal 
levels of input and output to maximize profit. 
In Indonesian palm oil industry, growers or industrial estates are treated as upstream industries and processor 
(crude palm oil) or CPO industries, as the downstream industries. The growers are assumed to purchase inputs 
from competitive market, and end consumers and retailers are assumed have no market power. Following the 
model and the modified model of Karp and Perloff (1993), then the cost adjustment as dynamic variable, 
quadratic linear oligopoly model is to measure seller power and buyer power can be built. In the input market 
(fresh fruit bunches), growers and processors interacted. Because both of them have the possibility to show the 
market power, then the model of two sides behaviour is used to test the market power.    
 
3. Research 
This research conducted in Central Kalimantan Province, with time series secondary data from 1998 to 2012 and 
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it also supported by primary data. The time series data is assumed stationary spread. To fulfils this assumption, 
the data is tested with Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test (ADF Test) using Eviews program to determine the 
stationary data. 
Market structure analysis uses two approaches, namely: (1) Concentration Ratio for Biggest Four (CR4) 
Approach; (2) Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) Approach. The formula to determine CR4 as follows:     
CR4= (The sum of market share for biggest four firm)/(The sum of market share in overall market) x 100% 
The criterions are:      
0% ≤ CR4 <50%, low concentration, the market structure is competitive 
50% ≤ CR4 < 80%, moderate concentration, the market structure is oligopsonistic  
80% ≤ CR4 ≤ 100%, high concentration, the market structure is monopsony  
Whereas, HHI is determined using formula as follows:       
n 
HHI= ∑ (MS)2 
i=1 
Where, HHI is Hirschman Herfindahl Index, n is sum of companies in product market area, and Si is share of 
purchase commodities from firm by- i (i = 1,2,3, ....., n). 
The criterions are:      
HHI <100, the market competitive level is high 
HHI <1000, the market is not concentrated 
1000 ≤ HHI ≤ 1800, the market is concentrated 
HHI> 1800, the market is highly concentrated 
Price determination analysis of palm oil fresh fruit bunches starts from the assumption that the price is formed 
when supply equals to demand, and then conducted the estimation of supply and demand of palm oil fresh fruit 
bunches. 
The supply function of palm oil fresh fruit bunches is: 
Ln(Qs) = ln(αo) + α1ln(PFFB) + α2ln (At) + α3 ln(Yt) + α4 ln (CH) + α5 ln(Te) + ε 
Where, PFFB is FFB prices, At is plant plantation area, Yt is productivity, CH is rainfall, and Te is time trend 
Hypothesis of estimated parameters: α1, α2, α3, α4, α5 > 0. 
The demand function of palm oil fresh fruit bunches as raw material of crude palm oil processing is: 
Ln QFFBD = ln (β0) + β1 ln (PCPO) + β2 ln (PFFB) + β3 ln (QCPO) + ε0 
Where, PCPO is CPO prices, PFFB is FFB prices, and QCPO is Productivity of CPO 
Hypothesis of estimated parameters: β1, β3, > 0; β2< 0 
The function of product processing cost of crude palm oil is: 
TC  =  ω0 + ω1M 
Where, ω1 is marginal cost of non-material inputs instead of palm oil fresh fruit bunches, which is the result of 
equation differentiation of TC towards output (M) or equal to the marginal cost (MC). 
Price determination analysis of palm oil fresh fruit bunches on imperfect competition market power uses 
modified model of Karp and Perloff (1993), the function of plantation farmers target and the function of firm 
target to maximize each profit as follows: 
∞ 
Πmp  = Σ βt-1[﴾Pt – Ct) qit - ﴾ γi + δ/2 µit) µit] and, 
t=1 
∞ 
πmn  = Σ βt-1[﴾Pot – wt) qoit - ﴾ γi + δ/2 µit) µit] 
t=1 
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First-order conditions of plantation farmers profit function (πmp) as seller contributes up price (Ptu); the price of 
palm oil fresh fruit bunches that desirable by farmers, if they demonstrate market power:  
Ptu = (1 + θi εi) -1 (pj + θi ηi pj + ci) 
First-order conditions of firms profit function (πmp) as buyer contributes down price (Ptd); the price of palm oil 
fresh fruit bunches that desirable by firms, if they use market power:  
Ptd = (1 + θj ηj ) -1 (pj + θj εj j pi + cj ) 
Where, θj is Conjektural elasticity, ε is demand price elasticity, η is supply price elasticity, p is input prices, and c 
is marginal cost. 
To calculate both sides of market power usage, this price is combined (Pi) into a single equation to determine the 
dominant market power: 
Pi = α Ptd + (1- α) Ptu 
If, α < 0.5, the upstream firms dominate the downstream firms, α > 0.5, the downstream firms dominate the 
upstream firms, α = 0, monopoly market power, α <0.5, oligopoly market power, α = 0.5, market competition, 
α > 0,5, oligopsony market power, α = 1, monopsony market power. 
To complement market power conditions, the conjectural elasticity should be identified, conjectural elasticity 
defined as follows: 
θ = θ0+ θ1PPI + θ2r 
Where, θ is (dY/dYi) (Yi/Y), PPI is Producen price index, and r is rate interest. 
Analysis of bilateral monopoly model approach in the price determination is assumed that farmers and firms 
realize the mutual dependence of approval implementation to produce the equal quantity and price productions. 
The profit functions of monopoly or oligopoly (Пmp) and monopsony or oligopsony (Пms) (Debertin, 1986; 
Koutsoyiannis, 1987, Andy Mulyana 2003) are: 
П            = Пmp + Пms = (PFFB*Qs – C(FFB) + (QCPO.PCPO – PFFB*Qs) 
= QCPO.PCPO – C (FFB) 
dП/dQs  = PCPO.DqCPO – d C(FFB)  =  0 
PCPO.DqCPO = d C(FFB) or MR of firms =  MC of farmers    
4. Result and Discussions 
4.1. Market Structure 
The analysis of Concentration Ratio for Biggest Four Firm (CR4) shows that market structure of palm oil fresh 
fruit bunches in Central Kalimantan has moderate level of concentration, it means that the type of  market 
structure is oligopsony, because the CR4 value is 0.7325 (73.25%) or the value ranges between 50% ≤ 73.25% 
< 80%. Whereas, the analysis of Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) shows that market structure of palm oil 
fresh fruit bunches in Central Kalimantan has high level of concentration, it means that the type of market 
structure is oligopsony, because the HHI value is 3912 greater than 1800. There are only a few processing 
companies of palm oil fresh fruit bunches that controls the purchases, because of the limitations of palm oil mills 
availability. 
4.2. Price Determination of Palm Oil Fresh Fruit Bunches on Imperfect Competition Market 
The result shows that if farmer (as the seller) joins the farmer groups institution (or cooperative) uses oligopoly 
market power, then the farmers can sell the palm oil fresh fruit bunches at higher price, which is IDR 1,715.026 
per kg of palm oil fresh fruit bunches or prices increase by 34.86 % of farmers’ real price (IDR 1,271.675 per kg 
of palm oil fresh fruit bunches). Conversely, if the firm (as the buyer) uses oligopsony market power, then the 
firm would only buy palm oil prices at lower price, which is IDR 1,270.835 per kg palm oil fresh fruit bunches, 
or prices decrease by 1.97 % of farmer’s real price (IDR 1,271.675 per kg of palm oil fresh fruit bunches. 
4.3. The Factors that Influence Market Power 
The result shows that the supply and demand price elasticity values are smaller than one and negative (0.19 and 
0.048 are inelastic). This term shows that monopsony or oligopsony market power has sizeable influence 
towards price determination of palm oil fresh fruit bunches in input markets, means that processing firm of palm 
oil fresh fruit bunches is more dominant in price determination. 
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4.4. Price Determination of Fresh fruit Bunches by Bilateral Monopoly Model Approach 
The analysis result uses market power as point 4.2 indicates that price ranges of palm oil fresh fruit bunches that 
agreed between farmers (as oligopoly sellers) and firms (oligopsony buyers) are IDR 1,715.026 to IDR 
1,270.835. The result that uses maximum profit approach (Debertin, 1986; Koutsoyiannis, 1987, Andi Mulyana, 
2003) indicates the agreed market price is the price at marginal revenue of firms equals to marginal cost marginal 
of farmers (IDR 1,280.601). Although the price is under the perfect competition market price, the agreed price is 











Figure 1. The Result of Bilateral Monopoly Market Model Analysis 
Pui = Oligopoly prices; Pdi = Oligopsony prices; PBM = Bilateral monopoly prices;  
PPC = Perfect competition market prices 
5. Conclusions 
The market structure of palm oil fresh fruit bunches in Central Kalimantan is oligopsony; the values of supply 
and demand price elasticities are smaller than one and negative (0.19 and 0.048 are inelastic). This result shows 
that oligopsony market power (firm as buyer) has sizeable influence and more dominant towards price 
determination of palm oil fresh fruit bunches in input markets. 
If firm (as buyer) uses oligopsony market power, so that firm would only buy palm oil fresh fruit bunches at 
lower price or the price decrease by 1.97 % of farmers’ real price. Nevertheless, if farmers (as sellers) who join 
farmer groups institutions (cooperatives) use oligopoly market power, then the farmers can sell the palm oil fresh 
fruit bunches at higher price, or price increase by 34.86 % of farmers’ real price. The approach of market power 
and bilateral monopoly market models show that there is agreement price range and agreement price between 
farmers and processing industry enterprises. 
 
6. Recommendations 
The price determination policy of palm oil fresh fruit bunches from government which has been benchmark of 
determination price system of palm oil fresh fruit bunches in Central Kalimantan; it can still proceed with 
improvements to increase prices in farmer level. Based on this research, we need to consider the element 
calculation of market power (conjectural elasticity) and factors that influence market power, such as supply and 
demand price elasticities in price determination formula. The approach of bilateral monopoly market model can 
be one of solutions to face the oligopsony or monopsony market structures, this should be followed by 
strengthen policy of non-profit oriented institutions of partnership farmers that have legal power, and its 
implementation requires supervision in the field. 
 
References 
Anindita, Ratya.  2008. The Economic Approach for Price Analysis. Kencana Prenada Media Group. Jakarta. 
Indonesia. 
Appelbaum, E.  1982. The Estimation of the Degree of Oligopoly Power. Journal of Economics, 19:  287 – 299.  
Azzam. A. M. 1996.  Estimating the Degree of Dominance in a Bilateral Oligopoly, Applied Economics Letter, 3, 
QD QPC QBM 
MR 
MFC 
MC = S 
MRP = D 












Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 




Bamin, A. I. 2000. Price Analysis of Palm Oil Fresh Fruit Bunches in Farmers Level of Nucleus Estate 
Smallholders of South Sumatra. Magister Thesis. Postgraduate Program. Sriwijaya University. Palembang 
Buschena and Perloff, 1991. The Creation of Dominant Firm Market Power. In The Coconut Oil Export Market. 
American Journal Agricultural of Economics. 73, 1000-8. 
Chalil, Diana and Fredoun Ahmadi-Esfahani. 2006. Modelling Market Power in The Indonesian Palm Oil 
Industri. Contributed Paper Presented at The AARES 49th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and 
Resource Economics Society Held Coffs Harbour. NSW, 9 -11 February 2005. 
Didu, M.S. 2000. Build Design of Development Decision Support System of Palm Oil Agro-Industry for 
Regional Economic Development. Summary of Doctoral Dissertation (unpublished). Postgraduate Program of 
Bogor Agricultural University. Bogor 
Debertin, D.L. 1986. Agricultural Production Economic. MacMillan Publishing Company. New York. USA. 
Faisal Basri. 1997. Economic of Indonesia Toward XXI Century. Economy Faculty, University of Indonesia. 
Jakarta 
Gumbira Sa'id, E and Harizt Intan. A. 2001. Agribusiness Management. Ghalia Indonesia Publisher. Jakarta.  
Henderson, J.M. and R.E. Quandt. Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical  Approach. Third Edition, McGraw-
Hill International Book Company. 
Irman. 1999. The Implication of Deternination and Formulation Prices of Palm Oil Fresh Fruit Bunches towars 
Farmers Profit of Nucleus Estate Smallholders OPHIR in Pasaman Regency, West Sumatra Province. Magister 
Thesis. Postgraduate Program. Andalas University. Padang 
Iwata, Goyoichi, 1974. Measurement of Conjectural Variation in Oligopoly, Econometrica, 42 (5), 641-50. 
Karp and Perloff, 1993. A Dynamic Oligopoly in the Coffee Export Market, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 75 (2), 448-57. 
Koutsoyiannis, A. 1987. Modern Microeconomics. Second Edition. Macmillan Education LTD. London, United 
Kingdom. Rhodes, V. J. 1973. Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 5, Number 3, (Dec.1973), pp. 
31-36. 
Mary K, Muth and Michael K, Wohlgenant, 1998. A Model of Imperfect Competition Using Marginal Input and 
Output Prices; Application to the Beef Packing Industry. Research Triangle Institute Center For Economic 
Research 3040 Cornwallis Road, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194 (919) 541-7289 muth@rti.org 
Miller, R. Leroy. 1982. Intermediate Microeconomics: Theorical Issues, Application. International Student 
Edition. 
Ministry of Agriculture Republic of Indonesia. 2012. Directorate General of Plantation of Ministry of 
Agriculture Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta. Data and Information Centers. 
Murtininingtyas, Endah, 2000. Market Power and the Degree of Dominance in the Word Palm Oil Market, PhD 
Dissertation. Departement of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Colorado State University. USA 
Schroter, Jhon R, Azzeddine M. Azzam, and Mingxia Zhang, 2000. Measuring Market Power in Bilateral 
Oligopoly.  The Wholesale Market for Beef.  Departemen of Economic, Iowa State University, 260 Heady Hall, 
Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070, USA.  
Soca, Andy Mulyana, 2003. Price Determination of Palm Oil Fresh Fruit Bunches in South Sumatera. Doctoral 
Dissertation. Department of Social Economics of Agriculture. Faculty of Agriculture. Postgraduate Program. 
University of Sriwijaya. Palembang 
Statistic Centre Bureau. 2012. Central Kalimantan on Yearly Number. Palangka Raya: Statistic Centre Bureau 
Syazda, Almasdi. 2003. Marketing New Paradigm of Agricultural Products based on Agribusiness in Riau 
Province. Journal of Economics. VIII/June/01/2003 Edition. Faculty of Economics. Tarumanagara University. 
Jakarta. Indonesia 
West, E.G. 1973. The Bilateral Monopoly Theory of Public Goods: A Critique. The Journal of  Political Economy, 
Vol. 81, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1973), pp. 1226-1235  
 
